NGO AND GRASSROOTS POLICY INFLUENCE: WHAT IS SUCCESS?

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PREFACE

IDR would like to extend its appreciation to the many Filipino colleagues who participated in this collaborative research and learning project. Their extraordinary work and thoughtful reflection has served as a foundation for this analysis. We wish to thank the participating coalitions and organizations - the Congress for a People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR), Council for People’s Development, Ethnic Studies and Development Center, Freedom from Debt Coalition, Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute and Multi-sectoral Peace Advocate, Nationwide Coalition of Fisherfolks for Aquatic Reform, PHILSSA Urban Poor Consortium/Urban Land Reform Task Force and the institute on Church and Social Issues, Task Force Total Commercial Log Ban and Haribon Foundation. In addition, we wish to pay tribute to the important work done by the excellent case writers and the coordinating organizations — Green Forum and CODE-NGO — and their dedicated staff members who facilitated the collaboration. We also would like to recognize the invaluable contribution of Dina Razon-Abad, former co-coordinator of CPAR and executive director of the Philippines-Canada Human Resources Development Program, who joined with IDR staff to produce the analysis and frameworks upon which this paper is based. She also wrote the summary section on CPAR in the text. Finally, IDR is grateful to The Moriah Fund, The Ford Foundation, The Asia Foundation, The Joyce Martz-Gilmore Fund, and the Canadian International Development Agency for their support of this cooperative endeavor and for their commitment to advancing knowledge and practice in the areas of policy advocacy, community participation, and equitable sustainable development.

The framework and conclusions presented in this paper reflect IDR’s analysis and are not intended to summarize or replace the overall analytical work being carried out by the participating Filipino organizations. IDR’s analysis focuses especially on issues and insights that we believe have relevance to NGOs and grassroots groups not only in the Philippines but around the world. We hope this work will serve as a catalyst to organizations interested in documenting and learning from their own as well as from other experiences.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Importance of Policy Influence to NGOs and Grassroots Organizations

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots groups working on equitable and sustainable development have grown in scope and number worldwide in the wake of government failure to overcome problems of inequity and environmental degradation. These organizations have supported traditionally marginalized communities in their efforts to improve the economic, social, ecological, and political conditions under which people live. Yet national and international policies increasingly undermine their sustainable development efforts and often limit the ability of low-income populations to participate effectively in society. As institutions representing and serving grassroots groups have gained experience and credibility in development and environmental work, many are adding formal policy influence to their agendas.

In the face of such challenges, these nongovernmental and popular organizations (POs) have identified several interrelated goals and priorities. They include the need to: change detrimental government policies, use grassroots experiences and innovations as the basis for improved policies, and strengthen local capacities and structures for ongoing public participation. When governments become more pluralistic, many of these organizations attempt to build on the new possibilities for citizen participation and NGO policy influence provided by such political openings. Grassroots groups and support organizations help give voice to those who have been historically marginalized and provide them with a crucial vehicle for exercising their rights and holding government accountable. As such, they play a vital role in strengthening democracy and the skills of citizenship essential to healthy societies. Increasingly groups are concerned about gaining the necessary leverage and power, often through coalition-building, to expand these democratic opportunities and to ensure the success of their development and policy efforts.

B. Significance, Methodology and Objectives of Study

NGOs and community organizations in the Philippines are recognized internationally for their creativity and experience in development, coalition-building and advocacy. Their challenges are similar to those of groups in other countries facing social tensions and political transitions from authoritarian regimes to more pluralistic systems. Consequently, the lessons drawn from their experiences can provide insights that may have great relevance far beyond the Philippines.

With the transition to formal democracy during the eighties, Filipino NGOs and popular organizations began playing major roles in policy influence. Their focus on policy change came principally as a result of two interrelated factors: the political opening presented by the new Aquino administration and the continuing government obstacles that groups encountered when trying to promote more equitable and sustainable approaches to development. Since the mid-eighties, these organizations have built large coalitions and accumulated a wealth of experience in policy influence, yet their work has not been thoroughly documented or analyzed.

This paper is based on the first systematic effort to study and analyze the experiences of Filipino coalitions’ efforts to influence policy and is part of a larger study on similar efforts taking place in different political and cultural contexts around the world. This study attempts to advance our understanding of the dynamics of policy influence and provide lessons and insights about a) different levels of policy success, b) key factors that help shape success, and c) some of the dilemmas and trade-offs inherent in NGO policy work. The paper draws from five case studies of Filipino coalitions and groups that focused on influencing policy through legislative and/or administrative change. The case studies were directed by the coalitions themselves—each hiring its own researcher to document and analyze the group’s experience.

The coalitions included a mix of people’s organizations — associations of the urban poor, peasants, indigenous peoples, and fisherfolk, as well as nongovernmental organizations — development and environmental NGOs such as university research institutes, advocacy and peace groups, and grassroots support agencies that provide technical assistance to low-income disenfranchised populations in such areas as community organizing, sustainable development, farming, and housing.

The research was a collaborative endeavor sponsored by CODE-NGO (the major Filipino coalition of NGO/PO networks), Green Forum (a network of Filipino
II. SOME KEY CONCEPTS: SOCIAL CAPITAL, POLICY ARENAS, AND DISCOURSE OF RESISTANCE

Robert Putnam1, in his studies on social organizations and government, uses the concept of ‘social capital’ to describe the web of organizations and norms that help people cooperate and coordinate with one another for the common good. His research indicates that by enhancing levels of reciprocity, cooperation and coordination, such organizations and the civic culture they promote are instrumental in the development of sound government, economic prosperity, and healthy societies.

Jane Covey2 and others have focused specifically on how such organizations help strengthen civil society and good government through institutional and coalitional efforts to influence economic and social development policies. They mention several specific ways that direct NGO policy work can affect civil society and government accountability. Among them are 1) educating citizens on important civic issues and ways to access the political system; 2) building a stronger institutional base of civil society; and 3) providing mechanisms for participation and policy change especially for disenfranchised sectors.

The research underscores the multidimensional nature of policy success. Consequently, the analysts also developed a framework for assessing the different levels of success across the cases. This framework looks at the ability of NGOs and POs to win gains in three areas: a) policy and legislation, b) political and democratic legitimacy and c) civil society. It takes into consideration whether groups have gained legislative or policy victories, increased the democratic space in which they operate, or strengthened their organizations in ways that help hold government accountable over the long run.

C. Organization of Paper

The paper contains seven sections beginning with an introduction that provides general background on methodology, objectives and the importance of policy influence to NGOs and grassroots organizations. It is followed by a section that examines concepts related to successful policy work such as civil society and social capital. Section III presents an overview of the Filipino political and social context; Section IV describes five Filipino case studies; Section V draws some key lessons and insights from those studies regarding success factors and makes comparisons. In the concluding two sections, trade-offs and dilemmas are discussed and finally, conclusions are presented that summarize some of the important findings.
targets as the executive, legislature/parliament, judiciary, government ministries and agencies, local officials, and in some cases even the police or military. The arena outside government involves such actors as NGOs, popular organizations, influential citizens or powerbrokers, church authorities, the public at large, the media, business and academia. The international arena involves another set of players such as international NGOs and federations of POs, donor governments, and world bodies such as the UN, World Bank and IMF, as well as multinational business interests.

Yet in situations of historic subordination and persecution, powerless groups may interact less directly with elite policy players. They may confront power differences not through the organized politics of direct policy advocacy but rather as James Scott argues through a less visible ‘discourse of resistance.’ On one level, these groups appear to accept their subordination however, on another, they resist in hidden ways that protect them from retribution when protesting their exploited position in society. They develop and use forms of popular culture and communication such as rumor, folktales, proverbs, song and poetry that quietly challenge elite domination and policy and that can eventually inspire the formation of social movements and organized political action.

III. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

In February 1986, after years of repression, a massive citizen’s uprising overthrow the Marcos dictatorship and swept Corazon Aquino, the widow of an assassinated opposition politician, into the presidency. Expectations were high that her government could overturn his legacy of corruption, persecution, and inequity and overcome the history of armed struggle such conditions had spawned. Reforms were launched. A new constitution encouraged the development of NGOs and grassroots groups; Aquino’s policy agenda called for greater citizen participation in decision making; and a new category of Congress person was established to represent traditionally disenfranchised sectors of society. These reform efforts took place in a world context of dramatic change and upheaval where economies and governments were being restructured to fit the new global order of international markets. The collapse of the Soviet model and the growing inequities of the capitalist system provided a greater sense of urgency and opportunity for groups seeking new approaches to politics and development, but also produced a greater level of doubt and confusion.

In the Philippines, the attempts to establish formal democracy led to a more pluralistic, fluid, open, yet unstable, political environment in which new alliances among policy players were possible and opportunities for policy influence greatly increased. This unusual political opening coupled with a large influx of foreign assistance facilitated the rapid growth of NGOs and grassroots groups and generated a widespread climate of hope. Yet many NGO and PO leaders, accustomed to the brutal repression and closed nature of the Marcos regime, found it difficult to adopt new strategies effective in the changing environment. As systems of patronage and corruption remained in place and military repression persisted, initial optimism about the pace and scope of possible change was tempered. Continuing problems of poverty, debt, and environmental degradation exacerbated social tensions and inequities. Government policies drawn from World Bank and IMF prescriptions favored export industries and foreign investment and led to further inequities and division.

In the Filipino context, a variety of organizational and political preconditions were necessary in order for NGOs to engage effectively in policy influence with the state. Factors related to a country’s political context clearly shape the approaches and ability of NGOs and grassroots institutions to influence policy and gain legitimacy. Given the particular history of the Philippines and its social movements, certain political preconditions had to exist before most groups were willing to move from an exclusive position of protest and confrontation v\v the government to a more flexible one which allowed interaction with the state on policy issues. These preconditions included certain indicators of openness, tolerance, and pluralism in the political system. Under Aquino, these were evidenced by new constitutional provisions favoring participation, the existence of sympathetic government officials and opportunities for direct representation in Congress by disenfranchised sectors of the population.

Under the repression of the Marcos regime, opportunities for policy influence had been severely restricted. Armed struggle, civilian protest, cultural resistance and community organizing became common forms of response. Marcos’ overthrow and the inauguration of the Aquino government created a
political environment that offered hope and change, at least initially. New policies were proposed that drew on the rhetoric of people’s participation and justice; old laws were challenged. Despite continuing repression, the democratic opening allowed NGOs and POs to gain access and operate in the arenas of Congress, the Executive and government agencies with some potential for impact. The existence of special members of Congress appointed by the president to represent the urban and rural poor also helped some of the coalitions gain an inside voice in legislative deliberations. New government appointees with close ties to the NGO movement increased the possibilities for policy interventions and for gaining access and legitimacy. The new constitution included guarantees regarding freedom of expression and a provision calling for grassroots participation in development–factors that further opened up the political space and provided some legal recourse to groups when they were harassed by the military or threatened by opposing interests such as logging companies.

A certain level of organization and political awareness among the Filipino NGO and popular sectors was also key in setting the stage for achieving successful policy outcomes. Within the more supportive context of the reform-oriented Aquino administration and the increased inflows of foreign assistance, NGOs and grassroots groups grow dramatically in number and sophistication forming large networks across ideological and geographical lines both to maximize resources and to influence policy.

IV. THE PHILIPPINE CASES

As Filipino NGOs and POs increasingly identified the political obstacles affecting their work and saw opportunities for actual influence, they placed policy advocacy higher on their organizational agendas and wove together ever broader networks to gain the clout and leverage necessary for policy change. In doing so, they experimented with and incorporated new forms of policy influence into their repertoire of action strategies. Because this paper draws on the experience and lessons of five different initiatives, brief descriptions of each case will be given which will include background on the following: 1) nature of the policy issue chosen, 2) coalitional history, capacities, attitudes, and structure; 3) other major policy players, allies and opponents involved in the issue; 4) strategies and tactics used by the coalitions; and 5) outcomes of the policy interventions. The cases focus on attempts to influence policies on urban housing and land reform, rural land tenure and use, aquatic reforms, logging practices, and indigenous land and community rights.

A. Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULRTF)

Formed in April 1991, the ULRTF drew on the experience of more than twenty years of community organizing efforts in poor neighborhoods of Manila principally under the auspices of progressive church-related institutions. Over the course of the Marcos dictatorship, these efforts became increasingly politicized resulting in divisions among organizations. Yet with the change in government, a broad alliance of NGOs, grassroots groups and church leaders interested in obtaining secure and safe housing for the urban poor came together. Since government policies had been so detrimental to low-income city families, they joined forces to advocate for an urban housing bill that would overturn two of the most hated Marcos policies affecting the urban poor: 1) the demolition of homes and communities by government agencies and land developers and 2) legislation that made building and living on unoccupied urban lands illegal and criminal.

The Task Force, an unusual amalgam of NGOs, grassroots organizations and individuals (most of whom were prominent Catholic church officials), decided to focus primarily on getting their specific demands incorporated into a bill already being considered by Congress. A separate secretariat, staffed by experienced NGO professionals, was formed to coordinate activities and provide technical support to the lobbying effort. The governance and decision-making structures of the coalition were fairly loose and, over the course of the campaign, trust and flexibility increased significantly, as certain groups withdrew who opposed further compromise.

The Task Force identified specific campaign targets and used a wide variety of strategies and tactics—mobilizing information and clout in support of their positions and using their strength to gain concessions, negotiate compromises and protest negative aspects of the law. Cardinal Sin, for example, held meetings and dinners with the top Congressional leadership to win their support for the campaign’s positions; the Bishop Businessman’s Conference convened discussions with land developer’s to modify their opposition; grassroots groups mobilized their members to fill the
Congressional galleries for key moments in the debate; and the coalition provided information and draft language to the two representatives of the urban poor who sat on the House committee in charge of writing up the legislation. As the bill moved through Congress, the coalition developed a set of negotiables and non-negotiables to guide their dealings with government.

During the course of the campaign, however, differences over focus and strategy resulted in the departure of some members of the coalition who felt the emerging bill was too watered down and no longer worth their time. Yet, the Task Force remained relatively strong, increasing in cohesiveness and eventually witnessing the passage of a housing bill. While not meeting their original goals, most members felt that their work had led to clear policy advantages for the urban poor since the bill established specific legal criteria for demolitions and a legal basis for people to live on unoccupied lands. The coalition’s efforts also increased the political legitimacy and credibility of its member organizations and their issue. In addition, the work gave leaders of the urban poor concrete experience in planning and carrying out advocacy strategies and in dealing and negotiating with powerholders. However, their focus on lobbying diminished the ability and time of grassroots leaders to fulfill all their obligations as heads of popular organizations and attend to constituency concerns. As a result some members became increasingly alienated and dissatisfied with the national advocacy efforts. After the legislation was passed, the coalition partners thought most of their policy work was completed but soon found that they had to use a variety of strategies from collaboration to litigation in order to get the law actually implemented and enforced.

B. Congress for People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR)

On May 29, 1987, recognizing the opportunity provided by the new constitution and aware of the urgency of consolidating elements of society supportive of fundamental reforms, especially agrarian reform, peasants came together under the broadest coalition in the history of the peasant movement in the Philippines: the Congress for a People’s Agrarian Reform Program. CPAR brought together 12 national federations of peasants, rural women and small fisherfolk united in the belief that a comprehensive agrarian reform and rural industrialization was the answer to the country’s three-pronged problem of poverty and underdevelopment, environmental degradation and social disintegration. Since government policies affected their lives and work so directly they decided to mount a major policy campaign.

CPAR’s structure was formal. Coalition policy-making was lodged in the National Coordinating Council composed of a representative from every coalition-member and a chairperson that rotated every three months. Planning, policy research and networking support was provided by a pool of representatives from 14 rural development-oriented NGOs which composed its expanded secretariat. Day-to-day operations and administration of the coalition was vested in a secretariat headed by a national coordinator and assisted by a full-time, paid staff complement of twenty.

The first task of the coalition was to develop and consolidate their collective position on the agrarian reform and rural development and frame it in a legislative package. This proposal was then subjected to a series of consultations not only with other peasant organizations and NGOs, but also with allies in the political/ideological movements, the churches, the academe and youth, student groups and the media, and potential allies in Congress, the bureaucracy, the professional and business sectors. The objective was to raise awareness of its proposals, as well as, to build a broader constituency around it. Therefore, a policy advocacy strategy was drawn up addressing two areas of intervention: first, the formal legislative arena, and second, the broader field of political action - the media, the bureaucracy, the streets and society in general.

In the legislative arenas, CPAR undertook the following: (a) identified and met, individually and in groups with sympathetic members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, (b) seconded its members from the expanded secretariat to help as consultants in the House Committee as Agrarian Reform, (c) attended Congressional Committee hearings and presented position papers; (d) coordinated closely with the House and Senate Committees on Agrarian Reform, (e) briefed and updated the Congressional media corps on the progress of their advocacy and the status of the debate, (f) organized delegations to meet with House and Senate leaders, and (g) pitched tents in the House of representatives’ grounds for a two-week vigil to press for the passage of the law.
Outside the halls of Congress, CPAR (a) held workshops and conferences with various sectors to draw up interest and support for their proposals, (b) organized rallies and demonstrations to press for acceleration of Congressional hearings and debates, (c) worked closely with allies in the Department of Agrarian Reform, (d) utilized every opportunity in the various media to move their advocacy agenda, and (e) launched a public awareness project, dubbed the ‘Agrarian Reform, Express’, that was capped by a huge public rally in Manila.

The different initiatives of CPAR initially bore fruit when the CPAR proposal was adopted, with minor modifications, as the working document of the House Committee on Agrarian Reform. Further hopes of substantial victory loomed when the House Committee Report, HB 400, which was still essentially the CPAR bill, reached second reading for floor deliberations. (Traditionally, the House leadership throws its support behind a Committee Report). The Senate version though not as substantial as CPAR would have wanted it, nonetheless, similarly received support from CPAR. To the extreme disappointment and frustration of CPAR members, many of whom travelled all the way from distant provinces for their first ever visit to Congress, the floor deliberation in both chambers, turned into an occasion for severely watering down the Committee Reports.

The final bill, which was signed into law by President Aquino as Republic Act 6657, was flatly rejected by CPAR as a ‘sham’. Undaunted by their failure to obtain legislative support for their version of a comprehensive agrarian reform law, CPAR convened its own congress, a People’s Congress, and passed its own People’s Agrarian Reform Code (PARCODE). Utilizing a constitutional innovation, allowing citizens to initiate or amend a law by a process of initiative and referendum (section 32, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution), CPAR embarked on a national PARCODE signature campaign. The object was three million signatures for PARCODE to recall RA 6657 and replace it with PARCODE. Limited logistics, inadequate planning and weak organization hampered the campaign from the very start. The campaign failed to secure the three million signatures and eventually was reduced to a national consciousness-raising activity that eventually fizzled out.

Even with the signing of the law CPAR persisted its advocacy for genuine agrarian reform and rural development. It organized the People’s Fact-Finding Commission, a multisectoral body to study and document anomalies related to the implementation of RA 6657 and prescribe solutions that could be undertaken by the people themselves. It continued to assist in building the capability of the federations, both on the national and local levels through resource accessing and training.

Despite the inability to get desired legislature, the agrarian reform policy advocacy brought other gains for CPAR. It brought back agrarian reform, and rural development high up in the agenda of national policy debate. It also broadened the constituency for the reform program beyond the peasantry and the NGOs to include the church, the academe, media, the professional and some business sectors, thus giving broader legitimacy to the demands of the peasant sector. Finally, it created opportunities for CPAR members to gain national recognition and expand their membership and base of support. When the coalition decided to disband at the beginning of the new Ramos government, they used a process of conflict resolution that permitted them to dissolve without extreme bitterness or resentment, thus allowing for easier coalition-building in the future.

### C. Nation-Wide Coalition of Fisherfolk for Aquatic Reform (NACFAR)

NACFAR, a coalition of eight major fisherfolk organizations, grew out of the structures of CPAR which originally included both peasants and fisherfolk. Increasingly fisherfolks saw their livelihood being threatened by government policies that resulted in overfishing by large commercial enterprises, growing pollution and reducing community access to fishing grounds. The experience of working under CPAR’s umbrella to develop a comprehensive agrarian reform law convinced the fisherfolk organizations that a similar effort could bring their sector’s plight to national attention and produce some concrete policy advantages. Unlike the Urban Land Reform Task Force, NACFAR focused their campaign on passing a comprehensive fisheries code that encompassed all of the coalition’s major demands and concerns. Powerful business, government and military interests opposed the code.

The coalition was coordinated by a separate secretariat of experienced professionals drawn from NGOs and popular organizations. A central decision-making body
made up of representatives from the eight member organizations was responsible for setting the direction of the campaign and deciding on key questions related to its operation. These same representatives, along with four members of the secretariat, formed NACFAR’s lobbying team. Allied NGOs, not formally part of the coalition structure, were tapped for their professional expertise when needed. However, influential supporters and powerbrokers such as Cardinal Sin were not brought in until the final weeks of the campaign when the lack of time limited their effectiveness.

To build grassroots support, knowledge, and unity, the campaign began its efforts by drawing on proposals from fisherfolk organizations in CPAR and incorporating their concerns into one overall legislative package. This alternative package was then presented for modification to fisherfolk groups around the country in a series of consultations and conferences. With this reform package as their starting point, the campaign mounted a multifaceted effort which involved a general public information and education campaign and the gradual cultivation of allies—sympathetic legislators, senior officials in the Executive branch, and leaders from the Catholic and Protestant churches. They employed a variety of strategies and tactics, learning along the way. These included: pilot testing one of the proposed reforms (Fishery Resources Management Councils) in several community demonstration projects; individual briefing sessions with legislators and executive officials; attendance in public hearings; presentations to Congressional committees; distribution of position papers; petitions and letter-writing campaigns; press conferences and media releases; mass mobilizations; and community-based popular education programs.

The development of the Fisheries Code with its accompanying consultations and discussions gave the participants an important education on policy concerns and alternatives. Based on the Code, NACFAR developed a series of narrower more specific demands some of which were approved by the Executive and line agencies. Although the proposed Fisheries Code did not move beyond Congressional hearings, the hearing process and media exposure provided fisherfolks with a forum to express their grievances and articulate their aspirations as a sector. The sector and coalition also won political legitimacy as evidenced by the respect they earned from certain legislators, Congressional staffers, bureaucrats, and from the Executive branch who named a NACFAR leader to Congress as a special sectoral representative.

For coalition leaders, the campaign was an invaluable education in the complexities of congressional and bureaucratic politics, the need for compromise, negotiation, and influential allies, and the importance of short-term goals in sustaining and moving a campaign towards strategic goals. It also helped them identify internal weaknesses that needed to be corrected for future efforts such as the low level of organization across the sector and the lack of adequate mechanisms for coordinating national campaigns. The campaign also underscored for them the importance of grassroots education efforts to draw in new members and strengthen existing groups.

D. The Task Force on a Total Commercial Log Ban

In the early years of the Aquino government, several legislators introduced bills calling for a ban or reduction of logging operations as a means to prevent further ecological deterioration. Subsequently in 1990, a small number of Manila-based environmental groups came together with a few related NGOs and PCs to launch a coordinated advocacy campaign in support of a total log ban. The national level campaign took place amidst a wide variety of effective local initiatives designed to halt commercial logging that emerged independently across the country as a response to community concerns about livelihood and sustainability.

As the Manila-based campaign reached out to groups outside the capital it incorporated grassroots economic concerns about equity and community use of forest resources into its call, modifying the campaign’s initial focus from a total log ban to a total commercial log ban. Yet despite occasional Task Force efforts to clarify the change, the general public never fully grasped the difference. Major logging interests used the confusion to polarize the debate and define the problem as one of livelihood for people vs. conservation of trees.

To run the campaign, the groups formed a voluntary-type Task Force made up of NGO staff professionals from member organizations based in Manila. This coordinating body worked through committees and divided operational tasks among these staffers who were assigned to carry out coalition functions in addition to their regular ongoing organizational duties. The Task Force was unable to incorporate the diverse,
often successful, community and regional log ban campaigns into their national effort which emphasized the voices of one or two internationally recognized coalition personalities with the media and Congress.

The TCLB Task Force used a variety of strategies and tactics to influence Congress and members of the Executive branch—providing information to legislators, bureaucrats, and the media, lobbying key offices and trying to demonstrate clout through rallies that often proved unsuccessful for lack of outreach capacity. Influence strategies, designed in response to individual events, were not balanced by actions capable of shaping events. They also seemed to reflect a somewhat static and closed view of the state and other policy players, a view which resulted in opportunities being missed for identifying and gathering important support especially among the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the academic community.

Lobbying efforts sometimes seemed to get locked into personality battles between government leaders and prominent coalition figures. The ad hoc nature of the Task Force structure further undermined their ability to lobby in a united fashion since decisions on certain policy positions were made by staff representatives and not always fully discussed with or shared by organizational leaders who did much of the direct lobbying. Consequently, Task Force members disagreed and ended up arguing with each other on two occasions in front of key government officials.

The TCLB campaign played a major role in placing environmental concerns on the national agenda and strengthening NGO understanding and commitment to the issue. Other outcomes, however, were limited. Despite increasing congressional support for the ban, the ad hoc Task Force won no real policy advantages nor did they seem to gain significant political legitimacy in government circles much beyond already concerned members of Congress and some line agency personnel. By increasing the visibility of the issue, however, the coalition probably helped create a more supportive policy environment for individual community groups who were eventually successful in their efforts to get local log bans passed. The Task Force also broadened its understanding of environmental and equity issues and gained experience in trying to influence government policies. It also developed a public education program and managed to expand its base from being an exclusively Manila-dominated grouping to one that included a few popular organizations. Yet these grassroots networks were very young and unable to participate effectively in the Task Force due, in part, to their own organizational needs and focus on internal education and consolidation.

**E. Ancestral Domain: Indigenous Communities, Lands and Resources**

While the indigenous sector of the Philippines (some 14% of the population) continued to face increasing economic and cultural disintegration under the Aquino government, they remained largely divided, unorganized and not active in politics. With no formal land titles to protect them, their communities and livelihoods were gradually being destroyed by a myriad of powerful interests including agribusiness, logging companies, plantation owners, government projects, and military officials.

Since the 1987 Filipino constitution upheld the right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands, indigenous groups pursued a variety of strategies to ensure the fulfillment of those rights ranging from international networking to organizing community-level legal education programs, to mapping ancestral lands, and even to reoccupying traditional lands. The impact of these often unconnected efforts was felt largely at the local level. Some indigenous groups working on national policy focused their attention on trying to get enabling legislation that would implement the provisions of the constitution. To do this, one set of groups chose to support a bill that would create a Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities and Ancestral Domain. They felt such a commission would provide a venue to legitimize the indigenous people’s position on community land holding and provide indigenous leaders an opportunity to participate directly in government. However, controversy over the wisdom of focusing on Congress prevented indigenous groups and NGOs from coalescing into a coordinated campaign or coalition. In the wake of a visible lack of concerted indigenous opposition, logging and ranching interests in Congress worked successfully to derail the bill’s discussion.

While a small group of progressive legislators remained supportive, the overall negative Congressional and government attitudes towards indigenous rights seemed not to change. Despite the failure to win any policy advantages through the
legislature, the impact of the lobby effort did increase discussion of these issues within the sector. The effort also identified some allies at different levels of the bureaucracy that could be tapped for future advocacy initiatives. However, major divisions within the sector were not overcome and questions still exist over what the balance and emphasis should be between direct policy influence work and community organizing with many groups opting for an almost exclusive focus on organizing.

V. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: COMMON LESSONS AND INSIGHTS

The Filipino cases provide certain insights into what factors contribute to success. While the lessons are derived from a particular moment in Filipino history and may not be directly applicable to different political and social contexts, these insights can be useful in raising important questions and issues for other NGOs and POs working on policy influence outside as well as inside the Philippines. It is hoped that learning about the Filipino experiences will challenge others to understand their own work in new ways and stimulate the development of ever more effective campaigns and policy-related activities. In this section, lessons and success factors will be compared and discussed in terms of the nature and definition of the policy issue, the nature and structure of the coalition, and the Urban Land Reform (ULRTF) strategies employed to win policy and institutional advantages. Table I summarizes the cases on each of these dimensions and is followed by a discussion of key findings.

<p>| TABLE I |
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<th>Urban Land Reform (ULRTF)</th>
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<td>I.  Nature/Structure of Coalition</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>No Coalition</td>
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<td>- Full time secretariat with professional expertise</td>
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<td>- Speedy, clear decision-making process</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Formal democratic structures of coalition decision-making and accountability</td>
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<td>II. Framing the Issue</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Taps urgent grassroots concerns</td>
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<td>Mixed</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Defined in terms of both narrow and comprehensive policy goals</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>III. Strategies/Tactics</td>
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<td>Medium</td>
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<td>- Building Allies/Getting Sponsorship</td>
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<td>Low to Med</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<td>Low to Med</td>
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<td>- Strategy to counter opposition</td>
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<td>- Willingness and strategy for negotiation</td>
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<td>- Grassroots education and organizing</td>
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<td>No</td>
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12
A. Nature and Structure of Coalition

The composition and structure of coalitions shape what a campaign is able to accomplish. A coordinating body with professional expertise and staff exclusively dedicated to the campaign enables a coalition to plan, coordinate and operate effectively. The Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULRTF), the coalitions of fisherfolk (NACFAR), and of peasants (CPAR) formed coordinating bodies made up of professional staff exclusively assigned to coalition work who coordinated planning, communication and campaign activities among members, convened and organized meetings, gathered relevant information for implementing the campaign, helped identify and build allies, and assisted in carrying out specific influence activities. NACFAR and CPAR established separate secretariats with full-time staff. ULRTF formed a more ad hoc coordinating structure made up of NGO staff members working solely on the campaign. Many NACFAR, CPAR and ULRTF staff came from NGOs that had ties to grassroots groups and a history of working on coalition issues. Their professional expertise and contacts gave the coalitions access to additional knowledge and resource people who helped increase the groups’ capacities.

Without resources to hire a full-time secretariat the Total Commercial Log Ban Task Force (TCLBTF) was structured on an ad hoc voluntary basis like the ULRTF but organized around committees made up of over-extended staff and functioned less productively. This coordinating body, composed of professional staff from its member organizations, divided coalition tasks among the group. Already overburdened with their individual organizational responsibilities, staffers assigned to these committees found it difficult to fulfill the multiple challenges that the coalition work demanded.

Decision-making structures affect an organization’s ability to influence policy and represent its members’ interests and concerns. Speedy, agile and clear decision-making processes allow groups to respond in a timely fashion to the fast-paced, multi-level nature of policy influence work. Formal democratic structures of coalition decision-making and accountability help establish common purpose, responsibility and ownership and hold together ideologically-diverse groups.

The ULRTF and NACFAR seemed to have the quickest and most effective decision-making processes although they had certain differences in structure that may have affected their accountability to overall coalition members. The ULRTF had a relatively ad hoc decision-making process where anyone present at a meeting was entitled to vote. When a decision was needed quickly, the ULRTF secretariat would convene a meeting. Whatever members were present then made the decision. This allowed for prompt responses but did not offer a system to ensure full representation. And while the secretariat was accountable for the decisions taken by those present at a given meeting, there seemed to be no mechanism for providing accountability to the coalition as a whole. The extreme informality of the ULRTF potentially meant that important groups were not involved in crucial decisions. However, the impartiality of the secretariat and their commitment to keeping members involved may have provided an informal channel for participation that ameliorated this structural problem.

NACFAR developed a decision-making mechanism that incorporated speed, flexibility, and a more direct process of representation and accountability. The governing board of NACFAR, the National Council of Leaders, included officers from member fisherfolk federations and was responsible for major coalition decision-making. In addition, these same officers formed NACFAR’s advocacy and lobby team along with four staff members from the secretariat. Working within the coalition’s general guidelines, this combined team made and implemented decisions on advocacy strategies and, therefore, was able to respond rather quickly to the ever-changing political dynamics of the campaign and the different policy players. This process, built on a clear system of representation, allowed for the development of timely decisions and common flexible positions. By incorporating structures of overall accountability into the mix, NACFAR seemed most able to also ensure effective participation and a high degree of member ownership and commitment.

In contrast, CPAR had a much slower more formalized decision-making process based on a strict adherence to consensus-building. In order to make important decisions on position or strategy, each federation underwent a consultation process with their organizations and then had to reach consensus with all other federations. This inhibited the coalition’s
ability to be flexible or timely in their responses but was crucial for holding their ideologically-diverse coalition together and maintaining a high level of accountability.

Formally the TCLB Task Force espoused a commitment to consensus decision-making and had a general assembly structure which met yearly that in theory stood above its coordinating body and committees. Yet in practice the Task Force seemed to have a two-level decision-making and operating structure that produced disjointed results and limited accountability. The two-tiered structure included, on the one level, NGO staff people responsible for the day-to-day campaign operations and, on the other level, senior NGO officials in charge of directing and carrying out lobby activities with one or two strong organization leaders playing a dominant role. Within the context of a weak over-burdened secretariat and the immediate urgent demands of lobbying, these individual leaders appeared to make major decisions on policy advocacy. While it’s not clear exactly how much consultation was undertaken before decisions were made, it is clear that communicating the nature of those decisions across the coalition was occasionally a problem. At times this lack of clarity and involvement prevented the lobbying group from speaking with a united voice and seriously undermined their ability to negotiate with certain government officials. Additionally, without a clear and more accountable decision-making system, the contributions of grassroots groups and other NGOs could not be fully incorporated into the campaign.

B. Framing the Issue

The nature and definition of the policy issue chosen by a group affects the process and outcomes of an influence campaign. Policy issues framed compellingly in ways that tap urgent concerns generate strong grassroots constituency support. The coalitions of fisherfolk and peasants (NACFAR, CPAR) and the Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULRTF) all focused on immediate survival needs of grassroots groups. The ULRTF emphasis on stopping demolitions and repealing the anti-squatter legislation responded to the urgent concerns of the urban poor and allowed for a broad constituency to be built around the policy issue. CPAR’s focus on land reform and NACFAR’s on fishing reforms tapped crucial livelihood concerns that promoted the development of strong grassroots support in their respective sectors.

In the Ancestral Domain case, the opposite occurred. Indigenous people’s groups framed their policy goals in terms of getting legislation for the establishment of a commission to study indigenous ancestral rights. While committed to the urgent question of land and cultural survival, their initial policy focus did not address these immediate needs in a compelling way. As a partial consequence, they were unable to win strong grassroots support for their campaign across a sector already divided along linguistic, cultural and political lines. Not surprisingly, they never formed a coalition.

TCLBTF was challenged to frame a dual message that reflected two different priorities—conservation and economic survival. The campaign was launched with a call for a total log ban which reflected the initial concerns of many of the Manila-based environmental groups who began the effort. Soon after, the call was changed to a total commercial log ban in order to incorporate the survival and equity concerns of grassroots groups that wanted to keep the forest available for their own subsistence needs. Never clarified during the course of the campaign, this mixed message confused the general public and made it more difficult to tap wider grassroots support. When a policy issue involves two sets of concerns and is especially difficult to frame clearly, it can produce a mixed message and confusion that can undermine the ability to build broader support among grassroots groups.

Issues can be framed a) in terms of achieving narrow policy objectives, b) as comprehensive policy goals aimed at transforming the fundamental structures of a society or c) they can be framed in ways that incorporate both. NACFAR incorporated both sets of goals and won some important policy gains. They first developed a comprehensive fisheries code which called for basic changes in control over fishing resources, later reducing their goals to a set of more modest but strategic demands. Designing the code helped involve and educate their constituency on critical issues. The code also gave them the vision and standard by which to determine what short-term goals were the most strategic to pursue and most likely to lead to long-term change. By using the comprehensive package to begin their campaign, they set the parameters for discussion with government and, as a result, probably opened up some negotiating room for themselves when they later narrowed their goals. They were successful in achieving objectives that were central to their long-term focus. For example, they got a five-year
moratorium on destructive commercial fishing practices in the Manila bay and recognition by some municipal governments for community-run councils to oversee local fishing areas.

The ULRTF did not develop a comprehensive urban land reform package or a wider set of long-term objectives but instead focused on achieving some specific goals within a preexisting urban housing bill. These included outlawing all demolitions of urban communities and repealing the anti-squatters legislation. They managed to get legislation passed to established certain criteria and procedures for demolitions and a legal basis for squatters to occupy land. However for ULRTF there remains a question about whether their focus on narrow goals not tied to a comprehensive long term vision will be capable of promoting significant change. Since their campaign was not carried out within this wider set of goals, opportunities for increasing grassroots understanding of longer-term issues were limited. Similarly, by not framing their call for a total commercial log ban within the larger issues of resources access and management, the TFTCLB failed to gain important grassroots support and commitment.

CPAR set forward an agenda of comprehensive reforms around land tenure and use. The coalition developed an alternative land reform bill (PARCODE) which served to involve and educate their members and formed the basis for their lobbying. Throughout the campaign, CPAR operated on principles that focused primarily on maintaining the coalition’s unity and winning basic changes in land ownership. While they did manage to get the issue of land reform visible and raise questions in public fora about land use and economic development, they only achieved tangential policy gains such as more favorable rice prices for one growing season. CPAR’s requirement for a formal consensus decision-making may have been a contributing factor in its inability to set and achieve strategic short-term goals.

Issues framed in ways that combine narrow objectives with more transformational skills provide opportunities for winning modest but strategic policy gains while creating the space and vision necessary for avoiding co-optation, educating constituencies, and building toward long-term fundamental change. When groups can incorporate both as NACFAR did, they have the possibility of achieving gains on all these dimensions.

C. Strategies and Tactics

A campaign’s strategies and tactics influence the kinds of success a coalition can achieve. Filipino organizations used a rich variety of strategies aimed at different policy players ranging from their own membership or constituencies, to government officials and even to leaders of opposition groups. The following discussion presents findings that look at these overall strategies in relationship to what coalitions were able to achieve.

Building allies among influential policymakers and powerbrokers and getting their support and sponsorship provides groups with strength for gaining policy influence and organizational legitimacy. The ULRTF and NACFAR were fairly successful in winning powerful allies for the urban poor and the fisherfolk among government officials and influential citizens. These allies were crucial in attaining policy gains for both coalitions and for helping them gain government recognition as being legitimate policy players.

CPAR started out with a combination of influential allies from government, the church and academe but was unable to sustain them throughout the campaign or effectively project their support for the coalition’s agrarian issues. While CPAR was seen as a legitimate policy player, it was less successful in achieving major policy gains. The TCLB Task Force established some key allies in Congress and the Executive on the log ban issue, but alienated an important director of a line agency who had the power to help the coalition in major ways. The TCLB attained some measure of legitimacy but did not achieve any real policy successes.

A concrete effective strategy aimed at opposition players can counter their potential impact on a campaign. ULRTF was most successful in using the authority and position of one of their coalition member organizations who had direct ties to the realtors and land developers. The Bishops Businessmen’s Conference held meetings with the opposition on urban reform issues which helped moderate their negative positions regarding the demands of the Task Force. The ULRTF was the only coalition that developed a clear strategy designed to counter and coopt their major opposition force.
The willingness and capacity of groups to negotiate with government and to accept the validity of incremental reform affects their ability to obtain policy gains and political legitimacy. Over time NACFAR decided that it was better to negotiate and scale down their demands than to lose all opportunity for winning policy advantages. Consequently, the coalition changed its initial demand from a comprehensive fishing code to a set of more modest goals. This scaled back package included strategic short-term objectives designed to further NACFAR’s long-term vision of grassroots empowerment and control over resources. In part due to its willingness to compromise, the coalition managed to secure some small but significant policy gains. These included, for example, the deputization by the Department of Environment and Natural Resource (DENR) of fisherfolk as environmental protection officers and local government approval for the piloting and implementation of NACFAR’s Resource Management Councils designed to encourage grassroots control of fishing resources.

The ULR Task Force demonstrated a willingness and capacity to negotiate and won important policy gains for the urban poor that established a legal basis for holding government accountable on issues of demolitions and squatter rights. The fact that the ULRTF defined a list of non-negotiables for their dealings with government helped them set parameters in their discussions with the state. Their view of policy success as incremental coupled with these discussions probably allowed them to compromise further when faced with the likelihood of total defeat later on in the legislative process.

CPAR’s seemed not have a clear strategy for negotiating less than a full package of agrarian reforms. The nature of CPAR’s coalition and its structures made negotiation with the state more difficult as did some member’s attitudes that reflected a monolithic view of government as the enemy. Their policy gains were very minor and less strategic than those of NACFAR or the ULRTF.

Effective grassroots education and organizing efforts help sustain and strengthen the institutional base necessary for holding governments accountable and for pursuing long-term policy change. Both CPAR and NACFAR carried out significant grassroots education programs and supported organizing efforts by their members. They ran training workshops and seminars on specific policy issues as well as on lobbying and negotiating skills. By involving grassroots groups in the development of each coalitions’ comprehensive legislative reform package, members analyzed and learned the details of their issue and the law-making process.

As a new coalition made up of relatively new fisherfolk federations, NACFAR’s advocacy campaign served as an organizing vehicle to expand their members’ constituencies. Where they had resources, NACFAR was successful in establishing new local affiliates.

The ULRTF carried out a much more modest education effort than those conducted by CPAR and NACFAR. It held one day seminars on lobbying skills and also involved organizations of the urban poor in an education and discussion process around the development of the coalition’s list of negotiables and non-negotiables. These limited education activities tied to rather narrow campaign goals did not seem to significantly strengthen their grassroots base.

The TCLB Task Force conducted a public education campaign through the schools and other citizens fora which was important for raising general environmental awareness. However, the Task Force was the weakest of the coalitions in direct popular education efforts and grassroots organizing and the least effective in strengthening local community-based organizations.

D. Measures of Success

In order to evaluate policy campaigns fully both on the basis of their short- and long-term accomplishments, success needs to be measured by gains achieved across three different dimensions—policy, civil society and democracy. Too frequently, a campaign’s success is defined solely in terms of winning immediate legislative or policy victories—a definition that ignores the long-term means to sustain those gains. Without strong NGO and grassroots groups able to hold government accountable, policy victories can be short-lived. Incorporating other dimensions of success such as gains in the strength of grassroots organizations, therefore, allows for a more complete analysis and understanding of a campaign’s effectiveness and potential for long-term impact.

Under this definition policy success is three-dimensional. Success at the policy level is seen as achieving favorable policy or legislative change. At
the level of civil society, it means strengthening nongovernmental and grassroots organizations capable of keeping government accountable and responsive to community needs. Finally, at the level of democracy, success means expanding the democratic space in which NGOs and POs function, increasing their political legitimacy, and improving the attitudes and behaviors of government officials and elites toward NGOs and grassroots groups.

Table II lays out these measures of success in an analytic framework which further details different aspects of each dimension. For example, policy gains are analyzed according to what body or branch of government granted them; gains in civil society include which kind of organization benefited, NGO or popular organization; and finally democratic gains also includes whether government or other elites actually changed their behavior in a positive way toward NGOs or POs. This aspect, however, was difficult to assess fully since the cases did not always provide information on such changes.

In the area of policy gains, every coalition except the total commercial log ban group achieved some direct measure of success. The ULRTF was successful in getting the legislature to pass an Urban Housing and Development Bill that responded to two of their constituency’s major demands regarding squatter’s rights and the stoppage of demolitions of poor neighborhoods. They also used the courts successfully to uphold squatter claims. CPAR’s peasant federations got some temporary gains through the Executive branch—the halt of some agricultural lands from being converted into commercial properties and the attainment of better rice prices. The fisherfolk of NACFAR managed to win several key demands through the Executive and its line agencies that helped protect traditional fishing grounds and lay the groundwork for establishing community control over fishing resources. These included the five-year closure of Manila bay to destructive commercial fishing practices, the halt of mangrove swamps being converted to big commercial fish ponds, and the deputization of fisherfolk as local environmental officers. NACFAR also won significant gains from a small number of local governments that agreed to allow the piloting and implementation of community-run Resource Management Councils to control access to fish stocks.

At the level of civil society, results for popular or people’s organizations varied considerably across coalitions while most NGOs tended to win moderate to high gains. Participation in the ULRTF seemed to strengthen NGOs associated with the campaign but had a mixed effect on POs. Like NGO staff involved in the urban reform effort, grassroots leaders probably increased their advocacy skills significantly, but much of the PO leadership became so heavily involved in the campaign that their ability to respond to the ongoing demands of their own base was curtailed. As a result, their organizations seemed to have been weakened and some members alienated from ongoing advocacy efforts. The Total Commercial Log Ban Task Force helped place environmental concerns on the agenda of many NGOs and thus contributed to strengthening the knowledge and issue base of NGOs but probably not their actual advocacy capacity or membership base. The TCLBTF scored relatively low on the PO aspect because they were unable to attract or involve significant numbers of grassroots groups. POs belonging to CPAR and NACFAR, on the other hand, were clearly strengthened by their coalition involvement as were NGOs associated with the campaigns but to a somewhat lesser extent. POs expanded and deepened their advocacy skills in strategy, negotiation and lobbying as did the NGOs belonging to CPAR’s and NACFAR’s expanded secretariats.

On the democracy dimension, all groups evidenced some measure of success. Each level of government that dealt with the ULRTF as well as many important elites from church, business and academe recognized the Task Force as a legitimate policy player and the urban poor as an important social and political force. This could be seen, for example, in the positive working relationships established with the Congressional leadership, in the presidential appointment of two representatives of urban poor organizations as special members of Congress and in the support of prominent church and business people through the Bishop’s Businessmen’s Conference.

On balance, the TCLBTF won moderate recognition from government but probably only low to medium levels from other elites. Certain members of Congress solicited their opinions on environmental issues and used the Task Force’s information but key players in the bureaucracy dismissed them as lacking seriousness, in part due to policy differences and an inter-coalition argument held in front of the director of a pivotal line agency. Both CPAR and NACFAR received some recognition from elite sectors, especially from church
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Success</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Urban Land Reform (ULRTF)</th>
<th>Log Ban (TCLB)</th>
<th>Agrarian Reform (CPAR)</th>
<th>Fisheries Code (NACFAR)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POLICY GAINS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
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<td>- Demolition criteria</td>
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<td>- Temporary stopping of land conversions</td>
<td>- 5 yr. closure of Manila Bay</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Squatter’s rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Better rice pricing</td>
<td>- no mangrove conversions</td>
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<td>Court</td>
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<td>- Upheld squatters rights</td>
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<td>- Piloting/Implementation of RMCs</td>
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<td><strong>CIVIL SOCIETY GAINS</strong></td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>Med to High</td>
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<td>POs</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOCRATIC GAINS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased democratic space and political legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Recognition of NGOs/POs as legitimate policy players (improved behavior)</td>
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<td>Other Elite Recognition i.e. Church, Business, Academia</td>
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<td>Low to Medium</td>
<td>Medium to High</td>
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and academia but also from individual business people. NACFAR seemed more successful in winning recognition as a valid policy player across the different levels of government than CPAR. The fact that the Filipino environmental agency deputized NACFAR members as environmental officers and that some local governments were willing to implement the coalition’s proposal for community resource management were clear behavioral indicators of this recognition.

E. Factors in Success

Factors that help determined success varied according to outcome (See Table III).

On the policy dimension, NACFAR and ULRTF achieved the highest gains. The factors that seemed most related to their ability to secure strategic policy or legislative outcomes included: coalition structures and full-time secretariats with professional expertise, speedy agile decision-making processes, a willingness and ability to negotiate with government, a more dynamic and less monolithic view of the state, alliances with power elites and other sectors, and a combination of modest but strategic short-term policy goals with comprehensive long-term goals.

On the civil society dimension, not surprisingly CPAR and NACFAR attained the strongest results. Made up of federations of peoples organization’s, these coalitions seemed able to strengthen their institutional and membership base for several reasons. Both coalitions included: grassroots empowerment as an explicit goal, a popular education component, and formal structures for accountability and decision-making. NACFAR also specifically envisioned the campaign as an organizing tool for the fisherfolk sector. Furthermore, by adding short-term policy demands to its call for a more sweeping comprehensive fisheries code, the coalition educated its membership on deeper structural issues while being able to win some small strategic victories that helped move their agenda forward and keep people motivated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
<th>FACTORS FOR SUCCESS</th>
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<tr>
<td>HIGH POLICY GAINS</td>
<td>Speedy agile decision making process</td>
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<td>Changed perception of state</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alliances with power elites and other sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition, structure, full time secretariat with professional expertise</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Narrow and comprehensive policy goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIGH CIVIL SOCIETY GAINS</td>
<td>Grassroots empowerment goal</td>
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<td>Campaign as organizational tool</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Popular education component</td>
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<td>Formal structures for accountability/decision making</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIGH DEMOCRACY GAINS</td>
<td>Political context</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Campaign</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Changed perception of state</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alliances with power elites and other sectors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Multiple advocacy targets</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Willingness and ability to negotiate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Narrow and comprehensive policy goals</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
All coalitions won some level of gains along the democracy dimension. This seemed to be related, in large part, both to the political and social context of the Philippines at that time and the simple fact that groups were actively operating and making demands on the political system. Having multiple state advocacy targets (the Executive office, line agencies, Congress, the courts, and local government) helped groups identify and cultivate potential allies. It also encouraged a more dynamic less monolithic view of the state which allowed coalitions to access the system more effectively and gain greater legitimacy as policy players. An accompanying willingness and capacity to negotiate seemed to increase democratic gains further as did building alliances with power elites and other sectors. Additionally, by combining narrow and comprehensive goals groups demonstrated their ability to act strategically yet practically.

VI. DILEMMAS AND TRADE-OFFS: QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

After analyzing these cases, we find that NGOs and POs engaged in policy influence faced common dilemmas around questions of structure, participation, vision, and strategy. While these often appear to be ‘either - or’ trade-offs, closer analysis indicates that if they can be overcome, they may provide avenues for achieving multiple objectives and success in a variety of areas.

A. Decision-making Structures

Questions of structure present one set of dilemmas and challenges. What structures allow for the fast decision-making necessary in the swift moving world of policy making while, at the same time, promoting democratic process, equitable representation and accountability? Coalitions that have more flexible, rapid decision-making structures such as the ULRTF seem to offer greater impact in the policy realm but may sacrifice full accountability and participation as a result. By having a system that grants voting power to everyone present at a meeting as did the ULRTF, organizations can respond quickly to changing events. But because organizational participation may be ad hoc and uneven depending on attendance, this decision-making structure may exclude important groups from certain key decisions and lead to alienation. Those, on the other hand, that have a formal consultative decision-making structure as did CPAR that ensure full coalition participation may be slower in operation and less effective in reaching policy goals. However such a structure may be crucial for strengthening organizational accountability and campaign ownership and be imperative for establishing and sustaining ideologically-diverse coalitions such as CPAR.

Structures that incorporate both flexibility and speed with maximum accountability and participation such as those of NACFAR provide a possible way to overcome the limits presented by the ULRTF and CPAR examples. By naming the coalition’s governing board to NACFAR’s lobby team (along with four secretariat staff members), agility and speed in decision-making was combined with full representation and accountability. The governing board was made up of one leader each from the eight fisherfolk federations; each representative was given the authority by their respective federations to make decisions regarding advocacy strategies and policy positions within the general parameters agreed upon by the coalition. This combination allowed NACFAR to respond to the fast-paced dynamics of policy work and simultaneously helped ensure greater ownership and commitment on the part of members to the decisions. This combined type of structure offers one way to overcome the dilemma that policy advocacy work often presents to groups around questions of speed and flexibility in decision-making versus fuller participation and accountability.

B NGO/Grassroots Relationships: Expertise and Empowerment

Many Filipino NGO leaders wrestle with the question of how they can ensure that their relationship with grassroots groups and POs remains an empowering one while still providing the technical expertise necessary for effective policy influence work. Coalitions or organizations that draw on professional staff such as the TCLBTF can offer solid technical expertise but their effectiveness and impact may be severely limited if they cannot establish a clear empowering relationship with grassroots organizations. In the TCLBTF case, this problem probably contributed, at least in part, to the coalition’s inability to tap and build on the many creative and successful advocacy experiences occurring at the local level. When professionals or prominent personalities tend to dominate decision-making or when POs are relegated solely to mobilizing their members...
for rallies or demonstrations as was sometimes the case in the TCLBTF and the ULRTF, community organizations may find it difficult to contribute their own expertise and may feel disengaged and disempowered by a campaign. If no strong second-tier leadership exists in POs, as in the ULRTF, or associated grassroots organizations, campaign demands placed on the top leadership may be so consuming that they do not have time to attend to the needs of their members or institutions. As a result, advocacy efforts may actually undermine the development and power of these organizations and their ability to hold government accountable.

Professionals can help overcome some of the tensions around expertise and empowerment if they are seen as fair-minded and are able to act as impartial facilitators and coordinators of coalition activities. As was the case in the ULRTF, they can perform both a technical and a facilitative role providing their unique expertise when needed on technical matters as well as on group process. They can try, as did the ULRTF staff, to oversee a process that incorporates the opinions of NGO and PO members either through direct participation in decision making or, if members are not present for decisions, through informal briefings and consultations afterward.

Such an impartial approach, while not perfect, can help balance this tension and provide room for tapping professional expertise while ensuring grassroots involvement.

Coalitions and organizations directed by people’s organizations such as CPAR and NACFAR which also include NGO professionals as staff members or associates incorporate both technical expertise and empowerment. By having professionals directly accountable to grassroots organizations, POs can take advantage of these specialists’ technical knowledge while maintaining their own authority and power over the campaign’s operations. By building allies with other NGOs and POs as was the case with CPAR and NACFAR, grassroots groups and coalitions can further increase their technical clout and their power to affect change.

However, other tensions regarding professionalism and empowerment are more difficult to address. As groups add policy influence to their agendas and depend more on professionals for expertise, there is a clear risk that organizations may lose touch with grassroots concerns. The Urban Land Reform Task Force for example, experienced a growing alienation of popular organizations from the advocacy process and from their own leadership. This seems to have occurred for several reasons. All the new demands being placed on the Task Force by the government during the implementation phase required a more technical orientation to the coalition’s work and the hiring of more technical personnel - directions that were not seen as immediately relevant to PO members or community priorities. A second reason involved leadership and time issues. During the campaign, the leaders of the member POs had spent much of their time away from their organizations - first developing strategies for the law’s passage, then trying to address the new demands of implementation. As a result they were overburdened by these pressures and many seemed to lose contact with their base. Moreover, since there was a general lack of second level leaders capable of filling the gap and no systematic plan or resources evidently to identify and train such second tier leadership, the popular organizations grew weaker, at least, in the short term.

This example points to a serious dilemma in policy work. While a campaign may be successful in getting policies changed or adopted, the process may diminish the strength of the very institutions that help generate ‘social capital’ and which are necessary for achieving policy reform in a pluralistic society over the long term. This concern is one that resonates across the research being done by the other coalitions and raises important questions about the need to place a higher priority on institution and constituency- building activities when designing policy influence efforts. If such activities are not incorporated and understood as a vital integral part of the process, policy work may actually undermine the institutional basis of civil society and the potential for promoting long-term social accountability and responsible government.

C. Vision, Structural Change and Strategy

The Filipino cases exemplify another broad concern — how NGOs and popular organizations can effectively respond to the openings that political transitions provide without losing their organizational integrity or commitment. The questions emerging from these experiences are similar to those arising from groups in other countries also trying to build more pluralistic and democratic political systems on the foundation of repressive governments, inequities and
sharp ideological divisions. In these situations, many leaders of grassroots movements and NGOs fear cooptation and constantly struggle with the tension between their desire to be pragmatic and their commitment to a vision of social justice — how to be consistent with values and ideals while trying to be realistic and practical about what is possible and what will move their vision forward in this new context.

In addressing these tensions, individuals must grapple with their own attitudes and histories as was the case with Filipino leaders. When dealing with the Marcos regime, most NGO and PO leaders saw protest and confrontation as the only means to transform the system and its policies. They wanted comprehensive social change that would overturn the inequity and corruption of the past. In this scenario, government was seen as a monolithic enemy to be opposed in its entirety—a view that for many remains strong. This mindset has affected the ability of organizations to maneuver in the new context and negotiate with the state. Besides a lack of concrete negotiation experience, many NGO and PO leaders who remained committed to transformational change were unprepared or unwilling to accept reforms or push for incremental change. Not surprisingly, they have maintained a highly suspicious stance regarding government. Yet, increasingly they are experimenting with ways to respond more flexibly in this new environment.

However, when groups see that deep structural changes are needed to overcome inequitable policies and practices, they face the question of how to craft appropriate influence strategies knowing that the new political context cannot respond to such sweeping demands. Organizations or coalitions that focus their influence work almost exclusively on achieving comprehensive change as in the case of CPAR maintain their ideals and principles in tact but if they cannot combine their vision with some practical short-term goals, they may forgo the opportunity to move their transformational agenda forward in small but significant ways.

Groups, such as the ULRTF, that focus on achieving incremental gains but seem not to share a clear long-term strategy for social change may win important short-term victories. However, without a longer vision, they may limit the impact of their work to purely palliative or ‘band aid’ responses and never contribute effectively to substantive change.

The most effective groups combine both short-term goals with a long-term vision that guides their day-to-day work. The fisherfolk federations first developed a comprehensive piece of legislation with their members that incorporated the coalition’s vision of social justice and its long-term concerns for transformational change. This fisheries code then provided the framework by which NACFAR leaders eventually chose their short-term policy goals and developed their negotiation strategy to deal with government. As a result, NACFAR was able to select and focus its energies on getting some strategic short-term priorities in place such as piloting and implementing the community-run Resource Management Councils, a mechanism that builds toward local control over fishing resources. The extent to which groups and leaders can develop strategies that combine a vision of long-term change with short-term goals seems to enhance their ability to avoid cooptation and build processes that can lead to more substantial transformation.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

A. Measures of Policy Success

Success in policy work is often defined very narrowly and focused on one set of short-term goals—winning legislative or policy victories. Long-term means to sustain these gains, such as strengthening and consolidating grassroots organizations, tend to get excluded or lost in the rush of everyday demands that such advocacy efforts generate. But without strong responsive grassroots institutions to monitor and press for changes, the ability to sustain victories and hold authorities accountable over the long run will be difficult. And without respect for basic democratic rights and a social contract that affirms the poor and powerless as legitimate players in the policy-making process, those gains become empty. Attaining short-term policy advantages, therefore, is a hollow even potentially counterproductive achievement without winning similar advantages in the areas of organizational development, constituency building and democratic rights. If efforts in policy influence are to be maintained over time, the definition of success must be expanded to include these elements. In addition, strategies must be designed in ways that promote success in all these different arenas.
Therefore, policy success needs to be viewed as multidimensional. Success involves winning advantages on three levels: 1) policy, 2) democracy, and 3) civil society. Specifically on the policy dimension this means winning positive policy or legislative changes to benefit NGO and grassroots constituencies and promote sustainable, equitable development practices. On the democracy dimension it means increasing the legitimacy and political space in which NGOs and POs operate as well as improving the attitudes and behaviors of powerbrokers and elites, especially of government, regarding NGOs and POs. It involves expanding the ability of groups to gain and exercise power so they can hold government accountable and influence the norms and practices of the state. On the civil society dimension it means consolidating and expanding the scope, functioning, accountability and effectiveness of organizations representing and supporting the poor. By so doing, the stocks of ‘social capital’ can be broadened—those levels of reciprocity, cooperation and trust that are increasingly being seen as fundamental to building accountable, more democratic and prosperous societies.

B. Transformational Goals

Groups seeking transformational objectives—basic changes in power relations—need an overall strategic vision that shapes and guides both long-term policy goals and short-term local actions. Since success in the policy or legislative arena is invariably partial and always filled with loopholes, winning sweeping comprehensive reforms or major shifts in power is highly unlikely. Accepting the legitimacy of achieving partial success, groups need to identify and pursue strategic short-term goals that build toward long-term structural change. When designing an effective long-term policy program, NGOs and POs also need to be willing to make trade-offs and strategic decisions regarding when to maximize different gains. Leaders, for example, may opt for achieving short-term narrow policy and legitimacy gains at the initial expense of sector or institution building. In these situations, they decide that winning short-term policy victories will lay the necessary groundwork for promoting longer-term organizational gains down the road.

When groups are seeking long-term transformational goals, they also need to be mindful of issues involving relationships with strategic allies. Coalitions and organizations inevitably face tensions and conflicts that are potentially destructive of long-term relationships necessary for moving a transformational agenda forward. When allied organizations decide to sever relations as a result of such differences they confront the question of how to dissolve their coalitions in ways that do not destroy the possibility of reconnecting again over common concerns sometime in the future. For example, in the ideologically-diverse coalition of CPAR, conflicts were inevitable and eventually led to divisions that were impossible to reconcile over the short term. When major differences surfaced, tensions were dealt with directly. A secretariat- run process of conflict resolution helped the peasant federations discuss and analyze their differences. The secretariat staff was clear on the importance of maintaining basic levels of respect between the federations and closing down the operation in as amicable a fashion as possible. This process ultimately led the members to decide to terminate the coalition but in a way that paid tribute to the contributions and accomplishments they had attained over the years. It also kept open the possibility of reuniting more easily at some future date.

C. Political and Social Context

A country’s political and social context shapes the attitudes and influence strategies of NGOs and popular organizations and affects the kinds of success they are able to achieve. The strategies and campaigns developed in one context may vary considerably from those developed in another. When state institutions are not democratic or representative and when government offices ignore community concerns, the scope of strategies available to groups for influencing policy is limited. Working with the Congress or parliament on legislative change, for example, will probably not be productive. Open confrontation and protest, in such circumstances, may be inevitable, although this may differ according to social and cultural context and levels of state repression.

These cases emerge from a particular Philippines context that was characterized by a history of repression, structures of formal democracy, the relatively peaceful overthrow of a dictatorship, and an unusual political opening that offered the hope of a more democratic government. Situations like the Philippines challenge NGOs and POs to respond to different political moments and opportunities. To be effective as the context changes, they need to be able to change and develop strategies appropriate to the possibilities presented by the new environment. In the
Philippines, for example, these included such opportunities as direct advocacy with state officials through the legislature, parliament, executive, line agencies, judiciary and local government or with the public at large through the media and public education campaigns. However, attitudes formed under previously violent and abusive regimes may hamper the ability of NGOs and POs to take advantage of the new maneuvering room. Accustomed to regarding the state as a monolithic deadly enemy, groups that find it difficult to identify and cultivate government allies and to negotiate with them for incremental reforms. Other groups may enter the fray with no strategic long-term vision and end up being coopted or diverted from their social change agenda and lose the opportunity to address crucial structural problems.

Transitions to a more democratic pluralistic state, however, are not smooth. Periods of openness and opportunity may be followed by greater state control and repression. President Aquino, as an example, faced several serious coup attempts during her administration which, if successful, could have led to an abrupt closure of the political maneuvering room opened up by Marcos’ overthrow. While groups need to take full advantage of periods when they can actively pursue policy reform, NGOs and POs also need to be prepared for times when they have to give priority to protecting and defending their society’s democratic openings and their own right to participate in policymaking.

The analysis of these cases has resulted in the development of a multidimensional framework of success. We believe these dimensions are universal as are the dilemmas associated with multilevel social change. In addition, we believe the issues related to decision-making structures such as accountability and agility also apply universally, but internal mechanisms for balancing power differences between groups may vary according to context.

Finally, the strategies and tactics employed in the Philippines come out of a specific social, political, cultural, and economic context and may not be applicable to other settings. What constitutes effective advocacy approaches may be very different from one country to another. To understand how these basic issues and success factors are addressed under different regimes and contexts, additional research and reflection needs to be conducted.

About the Author:
Dr. Valerie Miller has worked on issues of international development and human rights for twenty-five years with NGOs, grassroots organizations, and donor agencies in the US, Latin America, Asia and Africa. In the last ten years, she has been a planning advisor to UNICEF’s Central America office, Policy Director for Oxfam America and, most recently Director of Policy Programs at the Institute for Development Research and coordinator for an international secretariat of NGO networks working on community problem-solving and sustainable development policy. She has been an advisor to Congressional fact-finding missions to Central America and the Philippines and written extensively on development, democracy, education, and policy-related issues.

ENDNOTES

